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Abstract
In electronic marketplaces, after each transaction buyers will rate the
products provided by the sellers. To decide the most trustworthy sell-
ers to transact with, buyers rely on trust models to leverage these
ratings to evaluate the reputation of sellers. Although the high effec-
tiveness of different trust models for handling unfair ratings have been
claimed by their designers, recently it is argued that these models are
vulnerable to more intelligent attacks, and there is an urgent demand
that the robustness of the existing trust models has to be evaluated
in a more comprehensive way. In this work, we classify the existing
trust models into two broad categories and propose an extendable
e-marketplace testbed to evaluate their robustness against different
unfair rating attacks comprehensively. On top of highlighting the ro-
bustness of the existing trust models for handling unfair ratings is
far from what they were claimed to be, we further propose and val-
idate a novel combination mechanism for the existing trust models,
Discount-then-Filter, to notably enhance their robustness against the
investigated attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Electronic Marketplace Environment
Nowadays, electronic marketplaces, such as eBay (Fig. 1.1), have greatly facil-
itated the transaction processes among different people. As the enterprise of
electronic commerce becomes increasingly popular, worldwide, one challenge that
arises is to ensure that organizations participating in e-commerce have sufficient
trust in order to bring their businesses on-line (Zhang and Cohen [2006]). This is
because, unlike traditional face-to-face transaction experiences, it is hardly pos-
sible for buyers to evaluate the products provided by sellers before they decide
whether to buy from a potential seller.
Current e-commerce systems like eBay, allow buyers to rate their sellers ac-
cording to the quality of their delivered products after each transaction is com-
pleted (Fig. 1.2). In order to assist both individual buyers and business orga-
nizations in conducting both B2B and B2C e-commerce, researchers in artificial
intelligence have been designing intelligent agents to perform the tasks of buying
or selling, on behalf of their human clients (Zhang and Cohen [2006]).
In the context of the multiagent-based e-marketplace, when a buyer agent eval-
uates the reputation of a potential seller agent, he may need to ask for other buyer
agents’ opinions (advisors agents’ ratings) towards that seller agent (Fig. 1.3). We
define the following terms discussed in the remaining report:
• Honest seller : A seller that delivers his product as specified in the contract.
1
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Figure 1.1: Online shopping on eBay
• Dishonest seller : A seller that does not deliver his product as specified in
the contract.
• Reputation: A value calculated by trust models to indicate whether a seller
will behave honestly in the future: the higher reputation, the higher prob-
ability that the seller will behave honestly.
• Positive rating : A rating given by a buyer/advisor to a seller indicating a
seller is an honest seller.
• Negative rating : A rating given by a buyer/advisor to a seller indicating a
seller is a dishonest seller.
• Honest buyer/advisor : A buyer that always provides positive ratings to
honest sellers or negative ratings to dishonest sellers.
• Dishonest buyer/advisor or Attacker : A buyer that provides negative rat-
ings to honest sellers or positive ratings to dishonest sellers. Exception:
2
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Figure 1.2: Rating the seller after the transaction on eBay
Figure 1.3: Current seller reputation evaluation on eBay
some special attacker (e.g. Camouflage Attacker) may strategically behave
like an honest buyer.
• Trust or Trustworthiness : A value calculated by trust models to indicate
3
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whether an advisor is honest or not: the higher trustworthiness, the higher
probability that the advisor is honest.
Notice that, generally, the terms reputation, trust and trustworthiness are
used interchangeably in many works. To avoid confusion, in this report we use
them to model behaviors of sellers and buyers/advisors separately. In addition,
when a buyer evaluates a seller’s reputation, other buyers become that buyer’s
advisors: a buyer Bx seeks advice (in the form of ratings in e-marketplaces)
from his advisors {Bi|i 6= x} who have transaction experience with the seller
Sy in the evaluation of Sy’s reputation. The terms advisor and buyer are used
interchangeably in this report.
1.2 Cheating Behaviors in Electronic Market-
places
Cheating behaviors from sellers, such as not performing the due obligations ac-
cording to the transaction contract, are still possible to be sanctioned by law if
trust models fail to take effect. However, advisors’ cheating behaviors, especially
providing unfair ratings to sellers, are more difficult to be dealt with.
Dellarocas distinguished unfair ratings as unfairly high ratings (“ballot stuff-
ing”) and unfairly low ratings (“bad-mouthing”) (Dellarocas [2000]). Advisors
may collude with certain sellers to boost their reputation by providing unfairly
positive ratings while bad-mouthing their competitors’ reputation with unfairly
negative ratings. An example is that three colluded men positively rated each
other several times and later sold a fake painting for a very high price (Zhang
and Cohen [2008]).
1.3 Trust Models for Handling Unfair Ratings
Trust has become a common and important issue since Web 2.0. Researchers
studied trust and assisted people in choosing trustworthy online users in the
context of various domains (Josang et al. [2007]), such as forums (Zhang et al.
[2011a] and Zhang et al. [2011b]).
4
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To address the above challenge emerging in the context of e-commerce, re-
searchers in the multiagent-based e-marketplace have designed various trust mod-
els (a.k.a., reputation systems or trust and reputation systems) to handle unfair
ratings to assist buyers to evaluate the reputation of sellers more accurately. How-
ever, recently it was argued that the robustness analysis of these trust models
had been mostly done through simple simulated scenarios implemented by the
model designers themselves, and this cannot be considered as reliable evidence for
how these systems would perform in a realistic environment (Jøsang and Golbeck
[2009]).
If a trust model is not robust against, or vulnerable to, certain unfair rating
attack, mostly it will inaccurately compute a dishonest seller’s reputation higher
than that of an honest seller; thus, it will suggest honest buyers to transact with
a dishonest seller, and sellers can gain higher transaction volumes by behaving
dishonestly. If such dishonest behaviors—unfair ratings were encouraged and thus
growing without being sanctioned in the e-marketplace, none of B2B and B2C
e-commerce would survive. Therefore, there is an urgent demand to evaluate the
robustness of the existing trust models under more comprehensive unfair rating
attack environment before deploying them in the real market.
The “Agent Reputation and Trust Testbed (ART)” (Fullam et al. [2005]) is an
example of a testbed that has been specified and implemented by an international
group of researchers. However, it is currently not flexible enough for carrying out
realistic simulations and robustness evaluations for many of the proposed trust
models (Jøsang and Golbeck [2009]).
1.4 Our Contributions
In this work, we selected and investigated four well-known existing trust models
(BRS, iCLUB, TRAVOS and Personalized) and six unfair rating attack strate-
gies (Constant, Camouflage, Whitewashing, Sybil, Sybil Camouflage, and Sybil
Whitewashing Attack). We classified these trust models into two broad categories:
Filtering-based and Discounting-based, and proposed an extendable e-marketplace
testbed to evaluate their robustness against different attacks comprehensively and
comparatively. To the best of our knowledge, we for the first time experimentally
5
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substantiate the presence of their multiple vulnerabilities under the investigated
unfair rating attacks.
On top of highlighting the robustness of the existing trust models is far from
what they were claimed to be—none of the investigated single trust model is
robust against all the six investigated attacks, we further proposed and validated
a novel combination approach, Discount-then-Filter, for the existing trust mod-
els. This combination notably enhanced their robustness against all the attacks:
our experiments show most of Discount-then-Filter combined trust models are
robust against all the six investigated attacks. Equipped with such combined
trust models, e-commerce can be better safeguarded against unfair ratings—the
advisor cheating behaviors.
1.5 Report Organization
The rest of the report is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we consider related
work and describe our investigated attack strategies and trust models. Chapter 3
is about the e-marketplace testbed and the evaluation metric used in our experi-
ments. Based on the experimental results, we compare and analyze the robustness
of all the single trust models against each investigated attack in Chapter 4. Two
combination approaches for the existing trust models are described and evaluated
in Chapter 5. We conclude and recommend further work inspired by this research
project in Chapter 6.
6
Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Cheating Behaviors—The Attack Strategies
Various trust models have been proposed in different domains, such as P2P file
sharing systems, ad-hoc networks, e-commerce etc.. Go´mez Ma´rmol and Mart´ınez
Pe´rez identified several common vulnerabilities of these trust models and pro-
vided recommendations for improving them (Go´mez Ma´rmol and Mart´ınez Pe´rez
[2010]). Marmol and Pe´rez discussed several common attack strategies to the
trust models for distributed systems (Marmol and Pe´rez [2009]). However, these
studies did not evaluate attack strategies to trust models which are suitable for
e-commerce.
In the context of e-commerce, cheating behaviors or attack strategies can be
categories as Seller Cheating Behaviors and Advisor Cheating Behaviors. Al-
though the effectiveness of various attack strategies on trust models, including
those suitable for e-commerce, has been studied in many other works (e.g., Hus-
sain et al. [2007], Zhang et al. [2008], Hoffman et al. [2009], Feng et al. [2010] and
Zhang [2011]), there is usually a lack of detailed experimental studies, especially
the evaluation and comparison of a comprehensive set of unfair rating attack
strategies on different trust models.
In the remaining section, the two types of cheating behaviors in the context
of e-commerce will be discussed.
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2.1.1 Seller Cheating Behaviors
In e-marketplaces, typical cheating behaviors from sellers, such as Reputation Lag,
Value Imbalance, Re-entry, Initial Window, and Exit, have been studied by Kerr
and Cohen (Kerr and Cohen [2006]). A brief description of these seller cheating
behaviors are given below (Kerr and Cohen [2009a]).
• Reputation Lag : A common policy in many electronic marketplaces is that
the buyer pays before the seller ships the good. In this scenario, a seller
is likely to know that he intends to cheat from the moment he receives
payment. The buyer, however, will not know for some time afterward,
because of processing, shipping time, etc. Under some trust models, this
presents an opportunity for a seller: he can cheat a virtually unlimited
number of times before his reputation is updated to warn buyers of the new
cheating activity.
• Value Imbalance: In some trust models, all ratings are weighted equally,
regardless of the value of the transactions. This presents an opportunity:
a seller can honestly execute small sales, then use the reputation gained to
cheat on very large ones.
• Re-entry : Users can create new accounts freely; in large markets, it is infea-
sible to verify the identity of every trader. This presents the opportunity for
a dishonest trader to shed his bad reputation, starting fresh by opening a
new account. This is particularly dangerous in systems that treat unknown
sellers as preferable to disreputable ones.
• Initial Window : In some trust models, buyers rely only on their own ex-
perience in evaluating sellers. Once a buyer has found trustworthy sellers,
this policy works well. Unfortunately, the buyer is vulnerable until he finds
those trustworthy sellers—he does not have enough information to avoid
cheaters.
• Exit : If a seller cheats, it may damage his reputation, and hinder his ability
to engage in future sales. If the seller is planning to leave the market,
however, he has no further need for his good reputation. Thus, he can
8
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cheat freely, to the maximum extent possible, without consequence. This
is an extremely difficult problem to combat, and affects most trust models.
Kerr and Cohen assumed maximal cheating in their work of evaluating ro-
bustness of trust models against the above seller attacks: a cheating seller does
not ship out his product thus no cost is incurred, and the buyer will learn the
results only after the lag has lapsed (Kerr and Cohen [2009a]).
Recent work by Jøsang and Golbeck identified more seller attack strategies and
reduced all types of advisor cheating behaviors to Unfair Rating Attack (Jøsang
and Golbeck [2009]). Particularly, Kerr and Cohen found combined seller at-
tacks are able to defeat every investigated trust model (Kerr and Cohen [2009a]).
Researchers, especially those models’ designers, might be tempted to argue that,
cheating behaviors from sellers are possible to be handled by law and their models
are still robust against advisors’ unfair rating attack rather than sellers’ attack
strategies.
2.1.2 Advisor Cheating Behaviors—Unfair Rating Attacks
In this report, we argue that even though cheating behaviors from sellers are
possible to be sanctioned by law, advisors’ cheating behaviors are still able to
defeat the existing trust models; thus, improving the robustness of the existing
trust models for handling unfair ratings is urgently demanded.
To begin with, online transactions are essentially contracts: sellers are obliged
to deliver products as specified by themselves and buyers are obliged to pay the
specified amount of money. Therefore, most sellers’ cheating behaviors can be
considered as unlegal: in the real life, it is very common that buyers may sue
their sellers if the delivered products are not as good as specified by the sellers
according to the contract law.
Although sellers’ cheating behaviors can be sanctioned by law, advisors’ un-
fair ratings can only be considered as unethical rather than unlegal (Jøsang and
Golbeck [2009]), therefore there is an urgent demand to address the unfair rating
problem. Our paper focuses on advisor cheating behaviors and below are a list
of typical unfair rating attacks that may threaten the existing trust models in
e-marketplaces. Note that some attack names are used interchangeably in both
9
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seller attacks and advisors’ unfair rating attacks (e.g., Sybil Attack), in this report
we refer to the latter.
2.1.2.1 Constant Attack
The simplest strategy from dishonest advisors is, constantly providing unfairly
positive ratings to dishonest sellers while providing unfairly negative ratings to
honest sellers. This simple attack is a baseline to test the basic effectiveness of
different trust models in dealing with unfair ratings.
2.1.2.2 Camouflage Attack
Dishonest advisors may camouflage themselves as honest ones by providing fair
ratings strategically. For example, advisors may provide fair ratings to build up
their trustworthiness (according to certain trust models) at the early stage before
providing unfair ratings. Intuitively, if trust models assume attackers’ behaviors
are constant and stable, they may be vulnerable to this type of attack.
2.1.2.3 Whitewashing Attack
In e-marketplaces, it is hard to establish buyers’ identities: users can freely cre-
ate a new account as a buyer. This presents an opportunity for a dishonest
buyer to whitewash his low trustworthiness (according to certain trust models)
by starting a new account with the default initial trustworthiness value (0.5 in
our investigated trust models).
2.1.2.4 Sybil Attack
When evaluating the robustness of trust models, it is usually assumed that the
majority of buyers are honest. In our experiments, the aforementioned three
types of attackers are minority compared with the remaining honest buyers.
However, it is possible that dishonest buyers (unfair rating attackers) may
form the majority of all the buyers in e-marketplaces. In this report, we use the
term Sybil Attack, which was initially proposed by Douceur, to describe the sce-
nario where dishonest buyers have obtained larger amount of resources (buyer ac-
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counts) than honest buyers to constantly provide unfair ratings to sellers (Douceur
[2002]).
This attack can be considered as, dishonest buyers are more than honest
buyers and they perform Constant Attack together.
2.1.2.5 Sybil Camouflage Attack
As the name suggests, this attack combines both Camouflage Attack and Sybil
Attack: dishonest buyers are more than honest buyers and they perform Camou-
flage Attack together.
2.1.2.6 Sybil Whitewashing Attack
Similar to Sybil Camouflage Attack, this attack combines both Whitewashing
Attack and Sybil Attack: dishonest buyers are more than honest buyers and they
perform Whitewashing Attack together. Intuitively, this new combined attack
may pose a greater threat to trust models due to the presence of a larger number
of attacker identities.
2.1.2.7 Non-Sybil-based and Sybil-based Attack
Obviously, under the Constant Attack, Camouflage Attack and Whitewashing
Attack, the number of dishonest buyers is less than half of all the buyers in the
market (minority). We refer to them as the Non-Sybil-based Attack. On the
contrary, the number of Sybil Attackers, Sybil Camouflage Attackers, or Sybil
Whitewashing Attackers is greater than half of all the buyers (majority), and
these attacks are referred to as the Sybil-based Attack.
2.2 Trust Models for Handling Unfair Rating—
The Defense Mechanisms
Various trust models have been proposed to deal with different unfair rating at-
tacks. In the interest of fairness, we selected four representative models proposed
during the year 2002—2011 that self-identified as applicable to e-marketplaces
11
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and robust against unfair rating attacks. In this chapter, we also classify them
into two broad categories: Filtering-based and Discounting-based.
2.2.1 Beta Reputation System (BRS)
The Beta Reputation system (BRS) was proposed by Jøsang and Ismail to predict
a seller’s behavior in the next transaction based on the number of honest and
dishonest transactions (the two events in the beta distribution: [p, n], where p and
n denote the number of received positive and negative ratings) he has conducted
in the past (Jøsang and Ismail [2002]).
Whitby et al. further proposed an iterative approach to filter out unfair
ratings based on the majority rule (Whitby et al. [2004]). According to this
approach, if the calculated reputation of a seller based on the set of honest buyers
(initially all buyers) falls in the rejection area (q quantile or 1 − q quantile) of
the beta distribution of a buyer’s ratings to that seller, this buyer will be filtered
out from the set of honest buyers and all his ratings will be considered as unfair
ratings since his opinions (ratings) are not consistent with the majority of the
other buyers’ opinions (the majority rule). Then the seller’s reputation will be
re-calculated based on the updated set of honest buyers, and the filtering process
continues until the set of honest buyers eventually remains unchanged.
Obviously, the majority rule renders BRS vulnerable to Sybil-based Attack
because the majority of buyers are dishonest and the other honest buyers’ (the
minority) ratings will be filtered out.
2.2.2 iCLUB
iCLUB is a recently proposed trust model by Liu et al. in handling multi-nominal
ratings (Liu et al. [2011]). It adopts the clustering approach and considers buyers’
local and global knowledge about sellers to filter out unfair ratings.
For local knowledge, the buyer compares his ratings with advisors’ ratings
(normalized rating vectors) towards the target seller (the seller under evaluation)
by clustering. If an advisor’s ratings are not in the cluster containing the buyer’s
ratings, they will be considered as not consistent with the buyer’s opinions, and
12
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will be filtered out as unfair ratings. Obviously, comparing advisors’ ratings with
the buyer’s own opinions is reliable since the buyer never lies to himself.
If transactions between the buyer and the target seller are too few (few evi-
dence), the buyer will not be confident to rely on his local knowledge, and global
knowledge will be used. The buyer will compare his and the advisors’ ratings
towards all the sellers excluding the target seller by performing clustering. A set
of advisors who always have similar ratings with the buyer (in the same cluster)
towards every seller are identified. Eventually, these advisors are used to filtered
out the other untrustworthy advisors’ ratings when evaluating all advisors’ ratings
to the target seller.
In general, buyers’ local knowledge is more reliable than his global knowledge.
This is because when the set of advisors whose opinions are always similar to the
buyer’s cannot be found, the global knowledge will use the majority rule to filter
out unfair ratings; this may be vulnerable to Sybil-based Attack.
2.2.3 Filtering-based Trust Models
BRS and iCLUB filter out unfair ratings before aggregating the remaining fair rat-
ings in evaluating a seller’s reputation, therefore, we classified them as Filtering-
based. The reputation of the seller S, Γ(S), is calculated as:
Γ(S) =
∑
pi + 1∑
pi +
∑
ni + 2
(2.1)
where pi and ni are the number of positive and negative ratings from each
advisor i to the seller S after unfair ratings are filtered out. When S does not
receive any ratings, his initial reputation is 0.5.
2.2.4 TRAVOS
Teacy et al. proposed TRAVOS to evaluate the trustworthiness of advisors, τi,
and use τi to discount their ratings before aggregating these ratings to evaluate
the target seller’s reputation (Teacy et al. [2006]).
To evaluate an advisor’s trustworthiness, first, a set of reference sellers are
identified if these sellers’ reputation are similar to the target seller’s reputation
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as calculated by using this advisor’s ratings towards them. Then the buyer will
use the cumulative distribution function of beta distribution based on the total
number of his positive and negative ratings to each reference seller to compute
the trustworthiness of that advisor.
Compared with BRS, TRAVOS incorporates a buyer’s personal transaction
experiences with the target seller in the process of evaluating his advisors’ trust-
worthiness. However, TRAVOS assumes the advisors’ behaviors are constant;
thus, this model may be vulnerable if the attackers camouflage themselves by
giving fair ratings strategically before providing unfair ratings.
2.2.5 Personalized
Zhang and Cohen proposed a personalized approach to evaluate an advisor’s
trustworthiness τi in two aspects: private and public trust (Zhang and Cohen
[2008]).
To evaluate the private trust of an advisor, the buyer compares his ratings
with the advisor’s ratings to their commonly rated sellers. Greater disparity in
the comparison indicates discounting of the advisor’s trustworthiness to a larger
extent.
Similarly, the public trust of an advisor is estimated by comparing the advi-
sor’s ratings with the majority of the other advisors’ ratings towards their com-
monly rated sellers. Obviously, public trust adopts the majority rule in evaluating
an advisor’s trustworthiness and therefore may be vulnerable to Sybil-based At-
tack.
Since private trust is more reliable, when aggregating both private and public
trust of an advisor, this model will allocate higher weightage to private trust if
the buyer has more commonly rated sellers with the advisor (more evidence).
When the number of such commonly rated sellers exceeds a certain threshold
value (enough evidence), the buyer will only use the private trust to evaluate the
advisor’s trustworthiness more accurately.
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2.2.6 Discounting-based Trust Models
TRAVOS and Personalized calculate advisors’ trustworthiness and use their trust-
worthiness to discount their ratings before aggregating them to evaluate a seller’s
reputation. Thus, we classified them as Discounting-based. The reputation of
the seller S, Γ(S), is calculated as:
Γ(S) =
∑
τi × pi + 1∑
τi × pi +
∑
τi × ni + 2
(2.2)
where pi and ni are the number of positive and negative ratings from each
advisor i to the seller S, and τi is the trustworthiness of the advisor i. When S
does not receive any ratings, his initial reputation is 0.5.
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Chapter 3
Evaluation Method
3.1 The E-marketplace Testbed
3.1.1 The ART Testbed
Our experiments were performed by simulating the transaction activities in the
e-marketplace. An existing testbed, ART, has been developed within the trust
and reputation community for both competition and experimentation (Fullam
et al. [2005]).
The ART Testbed compares different trusting strategies as they act in com-
bination. In the art appraisal domain (Fig. 3.1), agents function as painting
appraisers with varying levels of expertise in different artistic eras. Clients re-
quest appraisals for paintings from different eras; if an appraising agent does
not have the expertise to complete the appraisal, it can request opinions from
other appraiser agents. Appraisers receive more clients, and thus more profit, for
producing more accurate appraisals (Fullam et al. [2007]).
While ART has much value, as mentioned in Chapter 1, it is not suitable for
carrying out experiments to compare robustness of trust models under different
unfair rating attacks. For example, the role of agents as both buyers and sellers
makes it difficult to isolate the effects of individual buyer/seller strategies (Kerr
and Cohen [2009a]).
16
3. Evaluation Method
Figure 3.1: Game overview of ART, demonstrating interactions between clients
and appraiser agents (Fullam et al. [2007]).
3.1.2 The TREET Testbed
Kerr and Cohen proposed TREET, an experimentation and evaluation testbed
based directly on that used in their investigations into security vulnerabilities in
trust and reputation systems for e-marketplaces (Kerr and Cohen [2009b] and
Kerr and Cohen [2010]).
The architecture is depicted in Fig. 3.2. In this diagram, BA and SA refer
to Buying Account and Selling Account respectively. BE and SE refer to Buying
Entity and Selling Entity respectively. All components labelled in italic text are
components that are intended to be provided/modified by investigators making
use of the testbed. The gray box denotes those components that are observable
by marketplace participants, although this does not imply complete visibility.
Each complete run of the testbed is represented by a SimulationRun, into which
the necessary arguments and objects are passed. A SimulationRun is responsible
for setup and configuration of a run—creation of the product set, initialization of
17
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components, etc.—and initiating the Simulation Controller. A set of numerous
tests can be executed by creating multiple instances of SimulationRun. A Sim-
ulation Controller is responsible for actual execution of a simulation run. The
controller triggers each of the day’s events in turn, signalling the appropriate
parties when they are required to take action. The scenario makes use of a single
centralized marketplace, represented by a Marketplace object. All offers, accep-
tances, and payments are made through the Marketplace. All accounts reside in
the Marketplace, and requests to open accounts are processed through it. (Kerr
and Cohen [2010])
Figure 3.2: The TREET architecture (Kerr and Cohen [2010]).
Although TREET is suitable for evaluation of seller attack strategies, it is not
flexible in incorporating various unfair rating attacks.
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Figure 3.3: The structure of the “Duopoly Market” Testbed.
3.1.3 The “Duopoly Market” Testbed
In light of the limitations of ART and TREET, we designed and developed an e-
marketplace testbed, which is extendable via incorporating new trust models for
handling unfair ratings or new advisor attack strategies (unfair rating attacks).
In our e-marketplace testbed, there are 10 dishonest sellers and 10 honest
sellers. To make the comparison more obvious, we considered a “Duopoly Mar-
ket”: there are two sellers in the market that take up a large portion of the total
transaction volume in the market. We assumed a reasonable competition sce-
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nario: one duopoly seller (dishonest duopoly seller) tries to beat his competitor
(honest duopoly seller) in the transaction volume by hiring or collaborating with
dishonest buyers to perform unfair rating attacks. We refer to the remaining
sellers (excluding the duopoly sellers) as common sellers.
Typically, trust models are most effective when 30% of buyers are dishonest
(Whitby et al. [2004]). To ensure the best case for the trust models, we added 6
dishonest buyers (attackers) and 14 honest buyers in the market for Non-Sybil-
based Attack, and switch their values for Sybil-based Attack.
The structure of the “Duopoly Market” Testbed is shown in Fig. 3.3. The
entire simulation will last for 100 days. On each day, each buyer chooses to
transact with one seller once. Since most trust models are more effective when
every advisor has transaction experiences with many different sellers, we assumed
that there is a probability of 0.5 that buyers will transact with the duopoly
sellers while there is another probability of 0.5 that buyers will transact with
each common seller randomly. The value of 0.5 also implies that the duopoly
sellers take up half of all the transactions in the market. When deciding on
which duopoly seller to transact with, honest buyers use trust models to calculate
their reputation values and transact with the one with the higher value, while
dishonest buyers choose sellers according to their attacking strategies. After each
transaction, honest buyers provide fair ratings, whereas dishonest buyers provide
ratings according to their attack strategies.
The key parameters with their values in the e-marketplace testbed are sum-
marized as follows:
• Number of honest duopoly seller : 1
• Number of dishonest duopoly seller : 1
• Number of honest common seller : 9
• Number of dishonest common seller : 9
• Number of honest buyer/advisor (|BH |): 14 (Non-Sybil-based Attack) or 6
(Sybil-based Attack)
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• Number of dishonest buyer/advisor or attacker (|BD|): 6 (Non-Sybil-based
Attack) or 14 (Sybil-based Attack)
• Number of simulation days (L): 100
• The ratio of duopoly sellers’ transactions to all transactions (r): 0.5
3.2 The Trust Model Robustness Metric
To evaluate the robustness of different trust models, we compared the transaction
volumes of the duopoly sellers. Obviously, the more robust the trust model,
the larger the transaction volume difference between the honest and dishonest
duopoly seller. The robustness of a trust model (defense, Def) against an attack
model (Atk) is defined as:
ℜ(Def,Atk) =
|Tran(SH)| − |Tran(SD)|
|BH | × L× r
(3.1)
where |Tran(SH)| and |Tran(SD)| denote the total transaction volume of the
honest and dishonest duopoly seller, and the values of key parameters in the
e-marketplace testbed |BH |, L, and r are given in Chapter 3.1.
If a trust model Def is completely robust against a certain attack Atk, theo-
retically ℜ(Def,Atk) = 1. It means the reputation of the honest duopoly seller is
always higher than that of the dishonest duopoly seller as calculated by the trust
model, so honest buyers will always transact with the honest duopoly seller. On
the contrary, ℜ(Def,Atk) = −1 indicates, the trust model always suggests hon-
est buyers to transact with the dishonest duopoly seller, and Def is completely
vulnerable to Atk.
When ℜ(Def,Atk) > 0, the greater the value is, the more robust Def is
against Atk. When ℜ(Def,Atk) < 0, the greater the absolute value is, the more
vulnerable Def is to Atk. It should be noted that, when Def is completely robust
against or vulnerable to Atk, in our experiments ℜ(Def,Atk) can be slightly
around 1 or -1 because the probability to transact with the duopoly sellers may
not be exactly 0.5 in the actual simulation process.
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In Eq. 3.1, the denominator denotes the transaction volume difference between
the honest and dishonest duopoly seller when the trust model (Def) is completely
robust against or vulnerable to a certain attack (Atk): all the honest buyers (BH)
always transact with the duopoly honest seller (SH , when completely robust) or
duopoly dishonest seller (SD, when completely vulnerable) in the 100 days with
a probability of 0.5 to transact with the duopoly sellers.
In our experiments, the denominator is 700 (14 × 100 × 0.5) if Atk is Non-
Sybil-based Attack, or 300 (6× 100× 0.5) if Atk is Sybil-based Attack.
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Chapter 4
Robustness of Single Trust
Models
4.1 Experiments
This chapter evaluates the robustness of all the trust models against all the at-
tack strategies covered in Chapter 2 with the e-marketplace testbed described in
Chapter 3. In our experiments, when models require parameters we have used
values provided by the authors in their own works wherever possible.
The experiments were performed 50 times, and the mean and standard devi-
ation of the 50 results are shown in Table 4.1 in the form of (mean ± std). The
robustness of all the single trust models against each attack is discussed in the
remaining of this chapter.
4.2 Robustness to Constant Attack
It is observed that all the trust models are robust against this baseline attack.
Consistent with Whitby et al.’s experimental results, our experiments also
showed BRS is not completely robust against Constant Attack (Whitby et al.
[2004]). Fig. 4.1—Fig. 4.4 depict under Constant Attack, how the transactions
of the duopoly sellers grow day after day when BRS, iCLUB, TRAVOS and
Personalized are used by honest buyers to decide which duopoly seller to trans-
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Table 4.1: Robustness of single trust models against attacks. Every entry denotes
the mean and standard deviation of the robustness values of trust model against
attack
Constant Camouflage Whitewashing Sybil Sybil Cam Sybil WW
BRS 0.84±0.03 0.87±0.04 -0.48±0.08 -0.98±0.09 -0.63±0.08 -0.60±0.10
iCLUB 1.00±0.04 0.98±0.03 0.81±0.10 -0.09±0.33 0.95±0.11 -0.16±0.26
TRAVOS 0.96±0.04 0.88±0.04 0.98±0.04 0.66±0.10 -0.60±0.09 -1.00±0.08
Personalized 0.99±0.04 1.01±0.03 0.99±0.04 0.84±0.12 0.67±0.09 -1.00±0.11
*Sybil Cam: Sybil Camouflage Attack; Sybil WW: Sybil Whitewashing Attack
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Figure 4.1: BRS vs. Constant Attack
act with. The transaction volume difference between the honest and dishonest
duopoly seller on Day 100 (around 700) indicates that iCLUB, TRAVOS and
Personalized are completely robust against Constant Attack.
Space prevents the inclusion of such figures for every trust model; throughout
this paper, all key data are presented in Table 4.1 and Table 5.1 and we use charts
where illustration is informative.
24
4. Robustness of Single Trust Models
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Day
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 
 
Duopoly Dihonest Seller
Duopoly Honest Seller
Figure 4.2: iCLUB vs. Constant Attack
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Figure 4.3: TRAVOS vs. Constant Attack
4.3 Robustness to Camouflage Attack
In this experiment, Camouflage Attackers give fair ratings to all the common
sellers to establish their trustworthiness before giving unfair ratings to all sellers
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Figure 4.4: Personalized vs. Constant Attack
(with a probability of 0.5 to transact with the duopoly sellers).
From the results of Table 4.1, without enough attackers, Camouflage Attack
does not threaten the trust models very much.
4.4 Robustness to Whitewashing Attack
In our experiment, each Whitewashing Attacker provides one unfair rating on one
day and starts with a new buyer account on the next day.
The value ℜ(BRS,Whitewashing) = −0.48 in Table 4.1 shows BRS is vul-
nerable to this attack. According to Fig. 4.5, the honest duopoly seller has more
transactions than the dishonest one at the beginning. However, after some time
(around Day 45) the dishonest duopoly seller’s transaction volume exceeds his
competitor. In fact, after some time the calculated reputation of a seller will
more easily fall in the rejection area of the beta distribution of an honest buyer’s
single accumulated ratings (single [p, 0] to an honest seller and single [0, n] to a
dishonest seller, where p and n become very large as transaction experiences ac-
cumulate) rather than Whitewashing Attackers’ multiple one-transaction ratings
(multiple [0, 1] to an honest sellers and multiple [1, 0] to a dishonest seller).
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Figure 4.5: BRS vs. Whitewashing Attack
The other trust models are robust against Whitewashing Attack.
4.5 Robustness to Sybil Attack
As described in Chapter 2, BRS is completely vulnerable to Sybil Attack due to
its employed majority-rule (Fig. 4.6).
The robustness of iCLUB is not stable as indicated by its standard deviation
of 0.33. To explain, an honest buyer can rely on his local knowledge to always
transact with one duopoly seller while using the global knowledge, which is wrong
when majority of advisors are attackers, to evaluate the reputation of the other
duopoly seller. The duopoly seller to always transact with can be either honest or
dishonest as long as his reputation is always higher than that of his competitor,
which is possible in either case.
Besides, TRAVOS and Personalized are not completely robust against Sybil
Attack. This is due to the lack of transactions among different buyers and sellers
at the beginning.
For TRAVOS, at the beginning it is hard to find common reference sellers
for the buyer and the advisor so the discounting is not effective (we refer to this
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Figure 4.6: BRS vs. Sybil Attack
phenomenon as soft punishment). When majority are dishonest buyers, their
aggregated ratings will overweigh honest buyers’ opinions.
For instance, if the trustworthiness of each dishonest and honest buyer are 0.4
and 0.6, and all buyers provides only one rating to a particular seller, according
to Eq. 2.2, the reputation of an honest seller is 0.41 < 0.5 (0.41 = (0.6 × 6 +
1)/(0.4 × 14 + 0.6 × 6 + 2)) and that of a dishonest seller is 0.59 > 0.5 (0.59 =
(0.4×14+1)/(0.4×14+0.6×6+2)); both suggest inaccurate decisions. However,
if a Discounting-based model is able to discount the trustworthiness of a dishonest
buyer to a larger extent, say 0.1, while promote that of an honest buyer to a larger
extent, say 0.9, the evaluation of sellers’ reputation will become accurate.
For Personalized, at the beginning the buyer will more rely on public trust to
evaluate the trustworthiness of an advisor, which is inaccurate when majority of
buyers are dishonest.
Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8 show that, as transactions among different buyers and
sellers grow, TRAVOS becomes more effective in discounting advisors’ trustwor-
thiness and Personalized tends to use private trust to accurately evaluate advisors’
trustworthiness.
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Figure 4.7: TRAVOS vs. Sybil Attack
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Figure 4.8: Personalized vs. Sybil Attack
4.6 Robustness to Sybil Camouflage Attack
Unlike Sybil Attack, Sybil Camouflage Attack is unable to render BRS com-
pletely vulnerable. Based on Fig. 4.9, this is because at the beginning attackers
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Figure 4.9: BRS vs. Sybil Camouflage Attack
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Figure 4.10: iCLUB vs. Sybil Camouflage Attack
camouflage themselves as honest ones by providing fair ratings, where BRS is al-
ways effective. After attackers stop camouflaging, the duopoly dishonest seller’s
transaction volume will soon exceed his competitor.
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Figure 4.11: TRAVOS vs. Camouflage Attack
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Figure 4.12: TRAVOS vs. Sybil Camouflage Attack
iCLUB is completely robust to Sybil Camouflage Attack. According to Fig. 4.10,
during the camouflaging stage, the honest duopoly seller will only transact with
honest buyers. After attackers stop camouflaging, only the reliable local knowl-
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edge will be used by honest buyers to evaluate the trustworthiness of the honest
duopoly seller (of high value), and honest buyers will continue to transact with
him.
Compared with Camouflage and Sybil Attack, Personalized becomes less ro-
bust against Sybil Camouflage Attack. This is because the public and private
trust of attackers have not been discounted to a large extent right after they
complete the camouflaging stage (soft punishment). When the majority are at-
tackers, their aggregated ratings will overweigh honest buyers’ opinions. After
attackers stop camouflaging, their private trust will continue to drop and Person-
alized will be effective.
Compared with Camouflage Attack, TRAVOS becomes vulnerable to Sybil
Camouflage Attack: although TRAVOS will inaccurately promote the trustwor-
thiness of a Camouflage Attacker (most are slightly larger than 0.5), when ma-
jority are honest buyers, the aggregated ratings from attackers are still not able
to overweigh honest buyers’ opinions. However, under Sybil Camouflage Attack,
when majority are dishonest buyers, these attackers’ aggregated ratings will easily
overweigh honest buyers’ opinions and render TRAVOS vulnerable.
Fig. 4.11 and Fig. 4.12 clearly show the difference of the robustness of TRAVOS
against Camouflage Attack and Sybil Camouflage Attack.
4.7 Robustness to Sybil Whitewashing Attack
This is the strongest attack: it can defeat every single trust model as observed
from Table 4.1.
Similar to Sybil Attack, the robustness of iCLUB against Sybil Whitewashing
Attack is still not stable.
Compared with Whitewashing Attack, BRS is still vulnerable to Sybil White-
washing Attack while TRAVOS and Personalized change dramatically from com-
pletely robust to completely vulnerable.
For TRAVOS, since every whitewashing attacker provides only one rating to a
duopoly seller, buyer cannot find reference seller to effectively discount the trust-
worthiness of whitewashing attackers to a large extent. When majority are soft
punished dishonest buyers, TRAVOS will always suggest honest buyers to trans-
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Figure 4.13: TRAVOS vs. Sybil Whitewashing Attack
act with the dishonest duopoly seller. The complete vulnerability of TRAVOS to
Sybil Whitewashing Attack is also depicted in Fig. 4.13.
For Personalized, since every whitewashing attacker provides only one rating
to a duopoly seller, the buyer cannot find enough commonly rated sellers and
will heavily rely on public trust to evaluate the trustworthiness of an advisor,
which is inaccurate when majority of buyers are dishonest. Therefore, similar to
TRAVOS, the trustworthiness of whitewashing attacker cannot be discounted to a
large extent and the soft punishment renders Personalized completely vulnerable.
It is also noted that although discounting-based TRAVOS and Personalized
are robust against Whitewashing, Camouflage, and Sybil Attack, their robustness
drops to different extents when facing Sybil Whitewashing and Sybil Camouflage
Attack.
Based on our results demonstrated in Table 4.1, we conclude that, none of our
investigated single trust models is robust against all the six attacks. Therefore,
there is a demand to address the threats from all these attacks.
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Robustness of Combined Trust
Models
5.1 Combining Trust Models
Based on the results of Table 4.1, Discounting-based trust models may change
from vulnerable to robust if some attackers’ ratings can be filtered out by Filtering-
based models to reduce the effect of Sybil-based Attack to that of Non-Sybil-based
Attack.
On the other hand, based on analysis in Chapter 4, under most attacks
Discounting-based models are still able to discount the trustworthiness of dis-
honest buyers to lower than 0.5 (although only slightly). Intuitively, filtering out
ratings from advisors with lower trustworthiness may be a promising pre-filtering
step before using Filtering-based models.
Therefore, we combine trust models from different categories to evaluate their
new robustness to the same set of attacks. Generally, there are two approaches
for combination: Filter-then-Discount and Discount-then-Filter (Fig. 5.1).
Details are given below.
5.1.1 Approach 1—Filter-then-Discount:
1. Use a Filtering-based trust model to filter out unfair ratings;
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Figure 5.1: Combining Trust Models
Table 5.1: Robustness of combined trust models against attacks. Every entry
denotes the mean and standard deviation of the robustness values of trust model
against attack
Constant Camouflage Whitewashing Sybil Sybil Cam Sybil WW
Filter-then-Discount
BRS + TRAVOS 0.89±0.06 0.87±0.03 -0.55±0.10 -1.01±0.11 -0.55±0.09 -0.59±0.11
BRS + Personalized 0.89±0.06 0.88±0.03 -0.34±0.05 -0.96±0.07 -0.53±0.08 -0.58±0.08
iCLUB + TRAVOS 0.96±0.03 0.98±0.04 0.95±0.04 0.85±0.08 0.97±0.10 0.70±0.12
iCLUB + Personalized 0.98±0.03 0.99±0.03 0.92±0.06 0.88±0.13 0.98±0.09 0.67±0.13
Discount-then-Filter
TRAVOS + BRS 0.95±0.03 0.86±0.06 0.98±0.04 0.91±0.06 -0.57±0.12 0.98±0.10
TRAVOS + iCLUB 0.95±0.04 0.92±0.03 0.93±0.03 0.91±0.12 0.91±0.10 0.94±0.12
Personalized + BRS 0.99±0.03 0.98±0.03 1.01±0.03 0.96±0.11 0.87±0.08 1.00±0.10
Personalized + iCLUB 0.97±0.04 0.95±0.02 0.98±0.04 0.92±0.09 0.94±0.09 0.93±0.07
*Sybil Cam: Sybil Camouflage Attack; Sybil WW: Sybil Whitewashing Attack
2. Use a Discounting-based trust model to aggregate discounted ratings to
calculate sellers’ reputation.
5.1.2 Approach 2—Discount-then-Filter:
1. Use a Discounting-based trust model to calculate each advisor i’s trustwor-
thiness τi;
2. If τi < ǫ, remove i’s all ratings (ǫ = 0.5 in our experiment);
3. Use a Filtering-based trust model to filter out unfair ratings before aggre-
gating the remaining ratings to calculate sellers’ reputation.
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Figure 5.2: BRS + TRAVOS vs. Whitewashing Attack
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Figure 5.3: BRS + TRAVOS vs. Sybil Attack
5.2 Robustness Evaluation
Eight possible combinations of trust models are obtained and their robustness
against all the attacks have been evaluated. Notice that the new model name
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Figure 5.4: BRS + TRAVOS vs. Sybil Camouflage Attack
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Figure 5.5: BRS + TRAVOS vs. Sybil Whitewashing Attack
follows the order of using the two different models. For instance, BRS + TRAVOS
means using BRS to filter out unfair ratings then using TRAVOS to discount the
remaining ratings in the evaluation of the sellers’ reputation.
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We will discuss the robustness enhancement of each combined model against
all attacks based on the experimental results presented in Table 5.1.
5.2.1 Filter-then-Discount
5.2.1.1 BRS + TRAVOS and BRS + Personalized
Similar to BRS, they are still vulnerable to many attacks such as Whitewashing
Attack, Sybil Attack, Sybil Camouflage Attack, and Sybil Whitewashing Attack.
The reason is, under these attacks BRS will inaccurately filter out some hon-
est buyers’ ratings and keep some dishonest buyers’ ratings after the first step
of Approach 1; the remaining unfair ratings will be used by Discounting-based
trust models to inaccurately suggest honest buyers to transact with the dishonest
duopoly seller.
Fig. 5.2—Fig. 5.5 depict under Whitewashing Attack, Sybil Attack, Sybil
Camouflage Attack, and Sybil Whitewashing Attack, how the transactions of the
duopoly sellers grow day after day when BRS + TRAVOS is used by honest
buyers to decide which duopoly seller to transact with. The negative transaction
volume difference between the honest and dishonest duopoly seller on Day 100
indicates that BRS + TRAVOS is vulnerable to these attacks.
5.2.1.2 iCLUB + TRAVOS and iCLUB + Personalized
Contrary to BRS, iCLUB is robust against Whitewashing Attack and Sybil Cam-
ouflage Attack. Therefore, iCLUB + TRAVOS and iCLUB + Personalized are
also able to effectively filter out unfair ratings at the first step of Approach 1, and
are robust against these attacks (Fig. 5.6 and Fig. 5.7). However, due to the insta-
bility of the robustness of iCLUB against Sybil Attack and Sybil Whitewashing
Attack, iCLUB + TRAVOS and iCLUB + Personalized are still not completely
robust against these attacks (Fig. 5.8 and Fig. 5.9).
5.2.2 Discount-then-Filter
The complete robustness of TRAVOS and Personalized against Whitewashing
Attack ensures all the attackers’ ratings will be filtered out at the first step of
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Figure 5.6: iCLUB + Personalized vs. Whitewashing Attack
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Figure 5.7: iCLUB + Personalized vs. Sybil Camouflage Attack
Approach 2.
As described in Chapter 4, although TRAVOS and Personalized are unable
to discount the trustworthiness of a Sybil, Sybil Camouflage or Sybil Whitewash-
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Figure 5.8: iCLUB + Personalized vs. Sybil Attack
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Figure 5.9: iCLUB + Personalized vs. Sybil Whitewashing Attack
ing Attacker to a large extent (soft punishment: only slightly lower than 0.5),
the threshold value we choose (ǫ = 0.5) is able to filter out all these attackers’
ratings at the second step of Approach 2. Therefore, Personalized + BRS and
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Figure 5.10: Personalized + iCLUB vs. Sybil Attack
Personalized + iCLUB are completely robust against Sybil Attack, Sybil Cam-
ouflage Attack and Sybil Whitewashing Attack. Likewise, TRAVOS + BRS and
TRAVOS + iCLUB are completely robust against most attacks.
Fig. 5.10—Fig. 5.12 show the complete robustness of Personalized + iCLUB
against Sybil Attack, Sybil Camouflage Attack and Sybil Whitewashing Attack.
One exception is that, TRAVOS + BRS is still vulnerable to Sybil Camouflage
Attack (Fig. 5.13). This is because TRAVOS inaccurately promotes attackers’
trustworthiness (most are slightly higher than 0.5) and their ratings are unable to
be filtered out at the second step of Approach 2. Unlike iCLUB, which is robust
against Sybil Camouflage Attack, BRS is vulnerable to it.
5.2.3 Conclusions
Based on the results in Table 4.1 and Table 5.1, we conclude that, robustness
of single trust models can be enhanced by combining different categories, and
Discount-then-Filter is most robust. Particularly, TRAVOS + iCLUB, Personal-
ized + BRS, and Personalized + iCLUB are robust against all the investigated
attacks.
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Figure 5.11: Personalized + iCLUB vs. Sybil Camouflage Attack
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Figure 5.12: Personalized + iCLUB vs. Sybil Whitewashing Attack
Fig. 5.14—Fig. 5.17 show how the robustness of the trust models is enhanced
with the Discount-then-Filter approach, while Filter-then-Discount is still vul-
nerable. In other words, if the e-marketplace is equipped with either BRS or
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Figure 5.13: TRAVOS + BRS vs. Sybil Camouflage Attack
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Figure 5.14: BRS vs. Sybil Whitewashing Attack
Personalized, the duopoly dishonest seller is able to gain a higher transaction
volume than that of the duopoly honest seller by hiring or collaborating with the
Sybil Whitewashing attackers. Therefore, as the time goes, this e-marketplace
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Figure 5.15: Personalized vs. Sybil Whitewashing Attack
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Figure 5.16: BRS + Personalized vs. Sybil Whitewashing Attack
will be filled with more and more dishonest sellers until it fails with all the honest
buyers exiting the market. In contrast, with Personalized + BRS, the Discount-
then-Filter combined trust model, only by behaving honestly is the duopoly seller
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Figure 5.17: Personalized + BRS vs. Sybil Whitewashing Attack
able to gain a higher transaction volume; thus, sellers are less motivated to hire
or collaborate with advisors providing unfair ratings. In this way, e-commerce is
better safeguarded against unfair ratings—the advisor cheating behaviors.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
Trust models can benefit us in choosing trustworthy sellers to transact with in
the e-marketplace only when they are robust against external unfair rating at-
tacks. Recently it is argued some trust models are vulnerable to certain attacks
and they are not as robust as what their designers claimed to be. Therefore,
robustness of trust models for handling unfair ratings have to be evaluated under
a comprehensive attack environment to make the results more credible.
In this project, we designed an extendable e-marketplace testbed to incor-
porate each existing trust model under a comprehensive set of attack models to
evaluate the robustness of trust models. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first demonstration that multiple vulnerabilities of trust models for handling
unfair ratings do exist. We conclude that, in our experiments there is no single
trust model that is robust against all the investigated attacks. While we have se-
lected a small number of trust models for this initial study, we can hardly believe
that other trust model will not have these vulnerabilities. We argue that, in the
future any newly proposed trust model at least has to demonstrate robustness
(or even complete robustness) to these attacks before being claimed as effective
in handling unfair ratings.
To address the challenge of the existing trust models’ multiple vulnerabilities,
we classified the existing trust models into two categories: Filtering-based and
Discounting-based, and further proposed two approaches to combining the ex-
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isting trust models from different categories: Filter-then-Discount and Discount-
then-Filter. We for the first time proved that most of the Discount-then-Filter
combinations are robust against all the investigated attacks. With such combined
trust models, only by behaving honestly are sellers able to gain higher transac-
tion volumes; thus, sellers are less motivated to hire or collaborate with advisors
providing unfair ratings. In this way, e-commerce is better safeguarded against
unfair ratings—the advisor cheating behaviors.
A concise version of this report titled “Robustness of Trust Models and Combi-
nations for Handling Unfair Ratings” was accepted by the 6th IFIP WG 11.11 In-
ternational Conference on Trust Management (IFIPTM’12) (Zhang et al. [2012]).
6.2 Future Work
Although our work focused on unfair rating attacks, we plan to combine sellers’
cheating behaviors with advisors’ unfair ratings, and evaluate their threats to the
existing trust models. We are also interested in re-designing new trust models
to be completely robust against all the investigated attacks without combining
existing ones. Since Sybil-based unfair ratings attacks are more effective than
Non-Sybil-based, we also want to design more effective unfair rating attacks with
limited buyer account resources.
We believe these directions inspired by this work will yield further important
insights in the trust management area.
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